Brain death and disorders of consciousness
While often confused by non-medical specialists, brain death and disorders of consciousness such as coma, vegetative state, and minimally conscious state are clearly distinct and unambiguously distinguishable. Moreover, biological models underpin each category uniquely and with increasing precision. In this Primer, we frame the distinctions across the different conditions, point to recent work that advances measurements able to identify their differences, and explain two inter-related paradoxes. The fi rst paradox is the brain dead patient whose 'phenotype' betrays the ultimate futility and lack of sustainability of the state. The second paradox is that of patients who retain apparent higher levels of cognitive function but who may be misidentifi ed as remaining in a vegetative state or one of the similar conditions formulated in the recently defi ned syndrome of cognitive motor dissociation. Building on emerging data and models underlying each of these brain states, we place recent controversies over the assessment of brain dead patients into a scientifi c and wider societal context. We conclude by placing brain death into a broader conceptual framework that takes account of emerging scientifi c knowledge about disorders of consciousness.
Brain death
The counterintuitive notion of 'brain death' while the rest of the body seemingly functions normally dates to the deliberations of the 1968 Harvard Ad Hoc Committee report, which sought to delineate a category of patients who might serve as organ donors due to the utter irreversibility and futility of their condition: whole brain death in which the brain stem and higher cortical functions are absent. While sustained by ventilator support, these patients can appear 'alive', with preserved cardiac function from retained cardiac pacing despite a lack of higher autonomic control. This phenotype can lead to confusion and ambiguity at the bedside
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Current Biology 26, R543-R576, July 11, 2016 R573 in which a patient's body is perfused and alive, yet the person can be declared dead following a proper history and neurological examination and additional testing.
Despite this apparent ambiguity, the diagnosis of brain death has at its core an unambiguous and fundamental biological model: all neurons within the cerebrum -the cerebral hemispheres and associated subcortical structures within the basal ganglia, thalamus and other subsystems -along with those within the brainstem are dead. Accordingly, brain death is expected to lawfully associate with measurement of total loss of brainstem function and cerebral death determined using techniques that assay cerebral blood fl ow or metabolism. Because such whole brain measurements of function may not be widely available and are expensive, clinical criteria aimed at a zero percent error rate of making an accurate diagnosis of brain death have evolved and undergone continuing refi nement.
At present, brain death is diagnosed if clinical evidence of the complete loss of brainstem function is present at the bedside and the patient demonstrates a failure of ventilatory drive in the setting of documented hypercapnia (signifi cant elevation of blood partial pressure of carbon dioxide over a chosen threshold) -the 'apnea test'. Fulfi llment of these criteria should invariably associate with an 'empty skull': no sign of any metabolic activity or blood fl ow measured by positron emission tomography, a ground truth linking the biological model to the clinical assessments. The appropriate application of the clinical assessments in the context of careful exclusion of potential confounds -for example, trauma limiting exam of all brainstem function, hypothermia, drug overdoseshould lawfully associate with total loss of cellular function within the brain. Because confounds may be present and circumstances could obscure accurate diagnosis in some instances, an important evolution from these mostly clinical criteria (brainstem examination plus the apnea test) has been the adoption of rules for when to enhance the assessment with accompanying additional measurements (such as blood fl ow or metabolic assessments).
Given the clear underlying model and in principle use of defi nite tests, brain death is a diagnosis that can always be correctly obtained, if properly assessed. An important recent national survey reviewing hospital brain death policies revealed signifi cant variability in their adherence to the 2010 American Academy of Neurology guidelines. Policies failed to adequately specify the use of ancillary tests, exclude hypotension and hypothermia as confounders and delineate the necessary credential of practitioners able to make the determination. These policy defi ciencies are likely to result in procedural errors of assessment. Given recent high visibility cases in which brain death diagnoses have been questioned, it is important to distinguish errors in assessment from misconstruals about the physiological legitimacy of brain death. If properly evaluated there should be no confusion about the diagnosis.
But the precision of the brain death diagnosis leads immediately to the Brain death marked by an asterisk is not a disorder of consciousness but a condition defi ned by death of neurons across the cerebrum (brainstem and cerebral hemispheres). A light grey zone encompassing coma, vegetative state (VS) and the left half of the minimally conscious state (MCS) region identifi es patients with cognitive motor dissociation (CMD). Cognitive motor dissociation is a clinical syndrome operationally defi ned as having a bedside examination consistent with coma, vegetative state or the limited non-refl exive behaviors seen in minimally conscious state patients who are unable to follow commands, and the concurrent demonstration of command-following utilizing fMRI, EEG or similar technologies alone. Cognitive motor dissociation indicates that a wide range of uncertainty exists regarding the ultimate underlying cognitive capacity in such persons as marked by the inverted bracket. The bottom left of the fi gure indicates the functional equivalence of coma and vegetative state as unconscious brain states in which no behavioral evidence of consciousness is present and both cognitive and motor functions are absent (vegetative state differing from coma by presence of intermittent eyes-open periods). The dark grey oval between coma/vegetative state and minimally conscious state indicates a transition zone in which behavioral fragments may be present. Once evidence of unequivocal but potentially intermittent behavior appear that are indicative of consciousness (e.g. visual tracking) this marks the diagnosis of a minimally conscious state. Recovery following emergence from a minimally conscious state begins with the confusional state (CS), in which patients cannot be formally tested using standard neuropsychometric measures and remain disoriented. Confusional state patients exhibit a limited range of cognitive functions. Locked-in state (LIS) designates normal conscious awareness but severe motor impairment, limiting communication channels typically to eye movements while complete locked-in state (CLIS) indicates the same level of function in a patient without any motor function to allow verifi cation of this degree of cognitive recovery.
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Disorders of consciousness
Prior to the 1960s and widespread adoption of intensive care unit treatments, patients with severe brain injuries producing coma rarely survived, and the syndromes of vegetative state and minimally conscious state that typically evolve over long convalescent periods were unrecognized. As in-thefi eld and intensive care unit medicine have evolved they have supported the recovery of patients across a wide spectrum of severe brain injuries who retain at least some evidence of brainstem or higher brain function. Both comatose and vegetative state patients are unresponsive to environmental stimuli, although refl ex movements may be present; in neither condition are goal-directed behaviors initiated. Comatose patients lack state variations and typically remain in a closed-eyes state that is unchanging even when presented with the most vigorous stimulation. Vegetative state patients, in contrast, show the recovery of irregular cycles of eye opening and closure; however, such periods are not diurnally patterned or correlated with identifi able electroencephalographic features of sleep or normal wakefulness. Coma and vegetative state both can represent transient states of brain dysfunction that give way to full or substantial recovery, or alternatively associate with overwhelming structural injuries that in some instances can approximate, but do not result, in brain death.
Coma is typically a transient condition when following an acute injury and refl ects widespread alteration of neuronal function across the corticothalamic system predominated by a massive withdrawal of excitatory neurotransmission; coma and general anesthesia show very strong similarities in state markers, supporting their common functional mechanisms. In the case of vegetative state, preservation of brainstem function in the absence of integrative cerebral activity provides the model for the retention of patterned periods of eye opening and eye closure and often other non-contingent refl ex behaviors.
The grey oval to the right of vegetative state in Figure 1 represents a transition zone in which patients fulfi lling the criteria for vegetative state may rarely demonstrate a complex, non-contingent behavior that is consistent with some preservation of function within the corticothalamic system. For example, a woman remaining in the vegetative state for 20 years was observed to emit single or bursts of unmodulated words that could not be patterned or elicited by sensory stimulation; brain imaging studies revealed loss of most connections across the corticothalamic system, with the exception of islands of preserved regions in the language dominant hemisphere. Such cases demonstrate an operationally distinct substrate above the isolated preservation of brainstem function that nonetheless remains consistent with the vegetative state diagnosis.
Demonstration of contingent responses to sensory input, even of a very limited level (for example, tracking of a visual stimulus by the eyes) is consistent with the minimally conscious state, a syndrome in which patients demonstrate unequivocal but inconsistent evidence of awareness of self or the environment through a wide variety of behavioral response patterns that can be demonstrated at the bedside. The functional boundary indicating emergence from minimally conscious state is the demonstration of reliable verbal or gestural communication, typically assessed using a short set of yes/no questions linked to simultaneously presented stimuli. The preservation of suffi cient corticothalamic functional connectivity to inconsistently produce this range of behaviors has been correlated with the integrity of both the anterior forebrain mesocircuit and the posterior medial complex of the parietal lobe, which are functionally coregulated. The 'mesocircuit hypothesis' predicts specifi c roles for different frontal cortical and related subcortical brain structures and changes in brain dynamics that may arise over time during the recovery process as patients transition from a minimally conscious state to higher levels of recovery. Within this framework, several studies provide evidence of these predicted mechanisms underlying functional transitions, as widely damaged brain networks gradually (or abruptly) become capable of supporting conscious behaviors of varying complexity. Similarly, the grading level of recovery after brain injury from coma through emergence from minimally conscious state level function is correlated with the level of functional connectivity of the posterior medial complex.
In summary, biological models for the minimally conscious state thus posit the wide preservation of largescale corticothalamic networks that are either not functionally active or are structurally absent due to injury in vegetative state and comatose subjects. These potentially recruitable cerebral networks in the minimally conscious state brain, however, do not maintain consistent levels of activity and fail to organize a suffi cient platform of ongoing integrative sensorimotor activity to allow for functional gestural or verbal communication.
High-level cognitive function without bedside evidence of such capacity
The dashed red line in Figure 1 denotes the lack of any motor response at the bedside. The conditions represented at the extreme lower right of the fi gure identify some fully conscious patients who can display a behavioral profi le completely consistent with comaeyes closed and remaining unresponsive to external stimuli presented at the bedside. This condition is defi ned as the 'complete locked-in' state (far right bottom of Figure 1) . By defi nition, complete locked-in state patients retain total preservation of cognitive function, and thus the complete locked-in state is not a disorder of consciousness. Locked-in state is a similar condition, which typically arises from either brainstem stroke that selectively disrupt the motor pathways or neurodegenerative illness that slowly impairs the function of motor neurons.
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An important advance in identifying such patients has been the development of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) techniques to test levels of cognitive capacity in individual subjects with severe brain injuries. In such persons, we see the opposite discordance to that seen in brain death: patients who show no behavioral response or very limited signs of consciousness just at the borderline of the minimally conscious state may nevertheless demonstrate functional brain activity that unequivocally reveals a higher functional status than that evident at the bedside. In contrast to brain death, where the patient looks better than the scan, in the minimally conscious state and higher levels of recovery, the scan can look better than the patient. Utilizing fMRI and EEG paradigms, subjects are asked to carry out specifi c mental tasks that can provide evidence of volition and awareness. Owen et al. (2006) fi rst reported a dissociation of motor function and cognitive capacity in a patient diagnosed as in the vegetative state, following traumatic brain injury. In this study, when the patient was asked to imagine playing tennis, fMRI signal activation consistently appeared immediately after the task command in the supplementary motor area of the frontal lobe, a location found consistently to show responses in healthy volunteers. Many similar paradigms have been validated in severely brain-damaged patients using fMRI, EEG or related techniques, including event-related potentials, which measure brain responses to a specifi c event, and electromyography, which detects electrical responses in muscles.
The light grey shaded box in Figure 1 denotes a particular subset of patients who may have behavioral profi les indicative of the comatose, vegetative or minimally conscious states, in conjunction with fMRI or electrophysiological evidence of an ability to follow commands. Such patients can be designated by the term 'cognitive motor dissociation', which has a precise operational defi nition marking such a dissociation between measured bedside behavior and the results of laboratory investigations. Cognitive motor dissociation emphasizes the wide range of ambiguity in establishing the actual level of cognitive capacity in any individual patient for whom such a dissociation is demonstrated. Notably, the capacity to follow commands, as indicated by fMRI or electrophysiological mental imagery methods, does not guarantee the capacity to use such methods to communicate. Establishing the cognitive capacity of an individual ultimately requires that they are able to initiate communication independently and respond to queries, which in principle is not possible using a oneway communication system. Thus, even if complete cognitive recovery follows in a particular case of cognitive motor dissociation, current technologies cannot yet verify that this level of recovery is present. Existing methods are unable to allow two-way communication for a cognitive motor dissociation subject, necessary to demonstrate their retention of full cognitive capacity (Figure 1) . A similar limitation is present for patients in a complete locked-in state as well, who are distinguished from those with cognitive motor dissociation only by their lack of direct injuries to the central nervous system. Recent studies support the strong biological inference that, when such capacities are retained in cognitive motor dissociation patients, the preserved brain function must be much closer to that of healthy controls and therefore such patients are expected to show physiological profi les much closer to those of locked-in state patients than those in a minimally conscious state. Specifi cally, studies have found a strong correlation of the identifi cation of positive, fMRI-based command-following response with the co-existence of widely preserved cerebral metabolic rates and the integrity of normal electrographic organization of wake and sleep patterns. Similarly, well-preserved cerebral metabolic activity is also correlated with behavioral evidence of consciousness consistent with a minimally conscious state. These observations demand further investigation of cognitive motor dissociation subjects' content of awareness and thorough examination of their capacities to re-establish twoway communication through the use of brain-computer interfaces as a future goal and an ethical imperative. Using such technologies, it should eventually be possible to grade variations in the cognitive capacities of individual cognitive motor dissociation subjects and develop targeted approaches to support their communication with the outside world.
More generally, the scientifi c advances reviewed above have signifi cant implications for how patients with disorders of consciousness and cognitive motor dissociation are viewed and treated by the health care system. In contrast to vegetative state patients, minimally conscious patients can perceive pain, have experiences and some have the potential to communicate. Yet, many are improperly diagnosed and receiving custodial care in the chronic care sector, far from the rehabilitative services that might help to restore functional communication. These scientifi c fi ndings call for reform of clinical practices and the enfranchisement of these patients with their civil rights and protections under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Conceptual challenges to brain death and an integrative response
Since fi rst articulated in 1968, and endorsed by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine in 1981, the notion of brain death has not been without its critics, some questioning its utilitarian origins as a means to procure organs for transplant and others from a deontological perspective raising theological concerns. A recent and sustained critique by Troug and Miller (2014) has questioned the President's Commission's fi nding that brain dead patients are dead because they have lost their ability to integrate biological function. They dispute this contention noting that "The scientifi c R576 Current Biology 26, R543-R576, July 11, 2016 evidence is clear -in many cases, brain-dead patients are biologically alive", noting that brain dead patients have retained functions of circulation, digestion, excretion, temperature control, wound healing, growth and development and gestating a fetus. While they acknowledge that there are sound reasons to view such patients as legally dead, they contend that this is justifi ed as public policy because they are 'biologically alive but psychologically dead'. In their view the philosophical coherence of the distinction remains.
Anticipating this line of argumentation -that patients without whole brain function but supported with life-sustaining measures are dying and not yet dead -the Commission found that any residual function was but a collection of 'organ subsystems' and that this did not constitute the functioning of the organism as a whole. Bernat et al. (2014) usefully noted that confusion over brain death can reside over the defi nition or the assessment of the state, whatever one is to make of it. It is our contention that the clinical assessment of brain death, if properly performed, is unambiguous and that the biology of that state can be evaluated with rigor and precision. The broader question about the philosophical cogency of the state, and its functional application as a bright line distinction in the law, remains.
In response, we would assert that it is useful to return to the defi nitional utility of integrative function. As is noted above, the loss of integrative function was persuasive to the President's Commission in their 1981 endorsement of brain death as biological death. With our evolving knowledge of these brain states one can see the progression of integrative function along the continuum of disorders of consciousness from brain death to the minimally conscious state and across the wide range of those patients fulfi lling the syndrome of cognitive motor dissociation. In brain death integrative function does not exist and any function of 'organ subsystems' is maintained, and sustained by artifi cial ventilation and artifi cial nutrition and hydration. In the vegetative state, a basic level of integrative function is achieved at an autonomic level with the return of brain stem function. Ventilatory support is often no longer required but artifi cial nutrition and hydration remain necessary. In the vegetative state there is no preservation of higher cortical function or the integrative sensorimotor function. The brain is dis-integrated, unable to act as a whole, only the brainstem integrative systems of the brain are functional.
Recovery of higher level, whole brain integration is in large part dependent upon the functional integrity of the anterior forebrain mesocircuit and the closely linked frontal parietal network following severe brain injuries. These mechanistic distinctions beginning with preservation of a functional brainstem for arousal to progressively normalized aspects of cortical-thalamic integration help to unify what Fred Plum described as distinction between the vegetative and sapient in his testimony in the Quinlan case. Seen within this broader diagnostic continuum, brain death can be understood, much as the President's Commission assessed it, lacking in both bodily and whole brain integrative function.
The philosopher Hans Jonas, in a response to the redefi nition of death in 1970, invoked Aristotle to remind us of the importance of viewing biological classifi cation on a nosological continuum, or 'life-spectrum'. With a pragmatic contingency he suggested that:
Giving intrinsic vagueness its due is not being vague. Aristotle observed that it is the mark of the welleducated man not to insist on greater precision in the knowledge than the subject admits, e.g., the same in politics as in mathematics. Reality of certain kinds -of which the lifespectrum is perhaps one -may be imprecise in itself, or the knowledge obtainable of it may be. To acknowledge such a state of affairs is more adequate to it than a precise defi nition, which does violence to it. I am challenging the undue precision of a defi nition and of its practical application to an imprecise fi eld. While we can precisely make the diagnosis of brain death based on our description and knowledge of that brain state, acknowledging the debate over whether patients who are brain dead have lost their integrative function is important if we want to be intellectually honest about the "intrinsic vagueness" about the broader normative questions about this brain state. It is our contention that by placing brain death within a biological continuum of proximate brain states, what Jonas might have understood as a life-spectrum, we can help mitigate lingering conceptual uncertainty about brain death and achieve greater, and legitimate precision for this important diagnostic category.
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